Happiest Thoughts: Great Thought Experiments of Modern Physics by Peacock, Kent A.
Happiest Thoughts  Page 1 of 34 
Happiest Thoughts:   
Great Thought Experiments of Modern Physics 
 
Kent A. Peacock 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Lethbridge 
 
1. Introduction:  Of Chickens and Physicists 
A physicist can be defined as a person for whom a chicken is a uniform sphere of mass M.  The 
point of this joke (which this author first heard from a physics professor) is that physicists 
shamelessly omit a lot of detail when they attempt to model and predict the behaviour of 
complex physical systems; indeed, one of the important skills that physics students must learn is 
knowing what to leave out when setting up a problem. This penchant for simplification does not 
necessarily mean that physicists are hopelessly out of touch with reality, however; for one can 
learn a surprising amount about how real things behave by thinking about apparently simplistic 
models.   
A typical textbook example of a physical model might be the block sliding down an 
inclined plane.  The plane is at a definite angle with respect to the force of gravitation; the block 
(a rectangular chunk of indefinite stuff) has a given mass, and there will be a certain coefficient 
of friction between the block and the plane.  The assignment might be to calculate the coefficient 
of friction that would be sufficient to prevent the block from sliding down the plane, as a 
function of the angle of the plane.  Now, no block of material in the world is perfectly uniform, 
no planar piece of material is perfectly flat and smooth, no actual coefficient of friction is known 
to arbitrary accuracy, and gravity is never exactly uniform in direction and magnitude.  And yet, 
there are many physical systems in the real world which are sufficiently like idealized models 
such as this, to a definable degree of approximation, that their observable behavior can be 
predicted using such models.  Models are therefore useful not only because they help us to 
picture how basic physical principles work in a concrete situation, but also as frameworks on 
which to hang a practical calculation.   
Even textbook problems couched in terms of simple models such as the inclined plane 
amount to thought experiments of a sort.  Usually, though, we reserve the honorific 
Gedankenexperimente for idealized scenarios that give us new insights into the meaning or 
limitations of important physical concepts, usually by testing their implications in extreme or 
highly simplified settings.  Suppose, for example, that I confusedly believe that all objects fall at 
a rate that is a function of their mass.  Galileo has an elegant thought experiment that shows that 
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my notion is a mistake:  all objects in a uniform gravitational field must fall with the same 
acceleration (ignoring air resistance), on pain of outright contradiction.1   
Galileo’s thought experiment, like most typical textbook models, can be translated into 
experiments that can actually be performed.  But sometimes one can learn a lot even from 
thought experiments that cannot be done, at least in the simple terms in which they are first 
described.  Mach invited us to rotate the entire universe around Newton’s bucket of water.  No 
granting agency will fund that feat, and yet Mach’s insights contributed (in a complicated way) 
to the construction of a theory (general relativity) that has testable consequences (Janssen, 2014). 
 In this chapter I describe several thought experiments that are important in modern 
physics, by which I mean the physical theory and practice that developed explosively from the 
late 19th century onwards.  I’m going to mostly skip thought experiments that merely illustrate a 
key feature of physics2 in favour of those that contributed to the advancement of physics.  Some 
thought experiments (such as Galileo’s) provide the basis for rigorous arguments with clear 
conclusions; others seem to work simply by drawing attention to an important question that 
otherwise might not have been apparent.  Many of the most interesting thought experiments have 
ramifications far beyond what their creators intended.  I’ll pay special attention to one particular 
thought experiment, defined by Einstein and his collaborators Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen 
(1935).  The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) thought experiment dominates investigations of the 
foundations of quantum mechanics and plays a defining role in quantum information theory; I 
will suggest that it may even help us understand one of the central problems of cosmology.  In 
the form in which Einstein and his young colleagues first described it, the EPR experiment was 
another idealization that probably cannot be performed.  Despite this, it has evolved into 
practicable technology.  While the thought experiments to be discussed here are key turning 
points in the history of modern physical theory, in several cases (including the EPR experiment) 
their full implications remain to be plumbed.   
It is an extraordinary fact that most of the definitive thought experiments in twentieth 
century physics were born from the fertile imagination of one person, Albert Einstein.  This 
forces us to ponder the importance of individual creativity in the advancement of science.  Music 
would be very different, and much diminished, had Beethoven died young.  If Einstein had not 
lived, would others have made equivalent discoveries?  It seems likely that many of his advances 
would have been arrived at by other competent physicists sooner or later—except perhaps for 
general relativity, for the very conception of the possibility of, and need for, such a theory was 
due to the foresight and imagination of Einstein alone.   
 
2. Sorting Molecules:  A Thought Experiment in Thermodynamics 
We’ll start with Maxwell’s Demon, a thought experiment that bridges 19th and 20th century 
physics.   
                                                 
1 For a nice analysis of Galileo’s thought experiment, see (Arthur, 1999). 
2 Such as the double-slit experiment.  For a lucid exposition, see (Feynman, Leighton, & Sands, 1965 Ch. 
1). 
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 James Clerk Maxwell (1831–79) is best known for his eponymous equations for the 
electromagnetic field.  He also made important contributions to statistical mechanics; in 
particular, he was the first to write the Maxwell-Boltzmann probability distribution which 
describes the statistics of particles in a Newtonian gas.  Although Maxwell did not originate the 
concept of entropy (which was due to Rudolf Clausius, 1822–88) he was well aware of the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics, which, in the form relevant to our discussion here, states that 
no process can create a temperature difference without doing work.  Maxwell fancifully 
imagined a box containing a gas at equilibrium, with its temperature and pressure uniform 
throughout apart from small, random fluctuations (Norton (2013a)).  A barrier is inserted in the 
middle of the box, and there is a door in the barrier.  A very small graduate student with 
unusually good eyesight is given the task of tracking the individual gas molecules and opening or 
closing the door so as to sort the faster molecules into (say) the left side, and the slower 
molecules into the right.  Apparently, then, a temperature difference can be created between the 
two sides by means of a negligible expenditure of energy.  The problem is to say precisely why 
such a violation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics would not be possible.   
There is a large literature on Maxwell’s demon, which we can’t hope to do justice to here.  
(For entry points, see (Maroney, 2009; Norton, 2013a).)  It is well understood that there is a 
sense in which statistical mechanics would, in principle, allow us to beat the Second Law—
albeit, in general, only for extremely brief periods of time.  The easiest way to create a 
temperature difference between the two boxes is simply to leave the door open for a very, very 
long time.  Eventually enough fast molecules will, by pure chance, wander into one side and 
enough slow molecules, again by pure chance, will wander into another, to create a measurable 
temperature difference between the gasses in the two boxes, at least until another fluctuation 
erases the gains made by the first.   Now imagine that the hole has a spring-loaded door which 
could snap shut as soon as a specified difference in temperature Δ𝑇 was detected between the 
two partitions.  The thermometer and door mechanism will have some definite energy 
requirement, but this can be made independent of Δ𝑇.   If we want Δ𝑇 to be large enough that it 
implies an energy transfer greater than the energy requirements of the door mechanism, all we 
have to do is wait long enough and eventually a large enough fluctuation will probably (not 
certainly) come along—although the larger we want it to be, the longer we (again, probably) 
have to wait.  (Let’s call this process “fishing for fluctuations”; like ordinary fishing the result 
can never be guaranteed.)  As soon as the desired temperature difference is detected, the door 
snaps shut and we would have “trapped a fluctuation” in a way that apparently violates the 
Second Law.  This example underscores the point made by Ludwig Boltzmann (and apparently 
well understood by Maxwell), which is that the Second Law is a statistical statement.  Violations 
of the Law by pure chance are possible.  In trying to exorcise Maxwell’s demonic assistant we 
are dealing with a question of what is overwhelmingly probable, not what is certain in a law-like 
way.  The question is not whether energetically-free sorting against entropic gradients (such as 
temperature or concentration) could be done at all, but whether it can be done reliably, 
repeatedly, and in a time span shorter than the life of the observable universe.   
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In 1914 Marian Smoluchowski presented a critique of the Demon in terms of the statistics 
of fluctuations (see Norton (2013a)), which Smoluchowski argued would almost always wipe out 
any gains against equilibrium that any conceivable demon could make.  Leo Szilard argued in 
1929 (1972) that information-theoretic constraints would prevent the demon from beating the 
Second Law.  The acquisition and manipulation of the information that the Demon would need in 
order to track the particles would, Szilard argued, inevitably dissipate more waste heat than could 
be gained by sorting the molecules.  John Norton (2013a) champions Smoluchowski’s analysis, 
and argues that the information-theoretic approaches to refuting the Demon popular from Szilard 
onward are all more or less circular in that they presume the validity of the Second Law.  More 
recently, Norton argues (Forthcoming) that the question of information is irrelevant and that the 
Demon can be ruled out on the basis of Liouville’s Theorem of statistical mechanics, which 
shows that the operation of a Maxwell’s Demon is strictly impossible in any system that 
undergoes Hamiltonian evolution (i.e., virtually every conceivable classical system).3  I will not 
attempt here to decide upon the correct theoretical analysis of the Demon.  Instead, let us invoke 
the other towering figure of 19th century science—Darwin—and sketch a view of the Demon 
from an evolutionary point of view.   
In biology it is well known that cell membranes regularly perform a process called active 
transport.  This involves the pumping of a wide variety of molecules or ions through tiny pores 
in a cell membrane against entropic gradients.  The intricate molecular machines that perform 
active transport in the walls of virtually all kinds of cells are the closest things in the biological 
world to Maxwell’s Demon, although they tend to create concentration differences, not 
temperature differences.  The crucial point is that any sort of active transport that has so far been 
observed and studied by cell biologists requires the expenditure of energy.  As R. N. Robertson 
puts it, 
Systems which can transport molecules against their concentration gradients or ions 
against their electrochemical potential gradients are called active transport systems… 
Such systems use energy provided by the cell to work against the tendency for everything 
to reach chemical equilibrium…  Formally, active transport is a reversal of the decrease 
in free energy which occurs when concentration or electrochemical systems tend toward 
equilibrium (1983, pp. 134–135). 
Is it conceivable that natural selection could arrive at a form of active transport that does not 
require the expenditure of some of a cell’s budget of metabolic energy?   
 There is growing evidence that natural selection tends to act so as to minimize the use of 
available energy.  Damian Moran and co-authors (2014) studied a species of eyeless fish which 
live in underground caves entirely devoid of light.  These fish use dramatically less metabolic 
energy than their surface-dwelling cousins, not only because they have no eyes, but because they 
do not partake in the energy-intensive circadian rhythm typical of animals exposed to the cycles 
of night and day.   As Moran et al. (2014) put it,  
                                                 
3 Norton also develops the same result for quantum systems.   
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While it is a strange thought for terrestrial vertebrates to entertain, it may be unnecessary 
for animals living in caves or the deep sea to rouse their metabolism for the onset of a day 
that will never arrive. 
If there is no particular survival advantage to paying the high metabolic cost of sight and all of 
the activities that go with it, a species that evolves its eyes away will have a survival advantage 
over one that does not.  And it seems likely that this would apply generally:  all things being 
equal, if there is a way to reduce energy expenditure it will tend to be found—and favoured—by 
natural selection.  Cellular life goes back well over three billion years, and natural selection has 
had all of that time to sample the possibility space for active transport and to converge on the 
means that are the most economical and efficient in their use of cellular resources, especially 
energy.  If it were indeed possible to micro-sort molecules against entropic gradients without the 
expenditure of energy, natural selection almost certainly would have found a way to do it by 
now.4   Arguably, then, we can take this as a good sign that Maxwell’s busy Demon is 
practically impossible, whether or not the last theoretical loopholes in the arguments against it 
can ever be closed.   
 
3. Thought Experiments in Relativity  
We turn now to a series of thought experiments that played important roles in the development of 
the special and general theories of relativity.   There is a vast literature on these thought 
experiments, and we can do little more here than sketch the most interesting ones and point in 
some directions in which philosophical or scientific questions about them may still linger.  
Einstein used a number of elegant models to illustrate how relativity works.  For 
example, he imagined a railway carriage rolling along at constant velocity with respect to a level 
embankment, and used this scenario to illustrate the relativity of simultaneity (Einstein, 1961).  
However, accounts of these illustrative models are widely available and they do not seem to have 
played a major role in his discovery of the theory.   
 
3.1 To Catch a Light Beam 
In his “Autobiographical Notes,” Einstein, writing more than fifty years after the fact, claims that 
he “hit upon” a paradox at the age of sixteen: 
If I pursue a beam of light with velocity c … I should observe such a beam of light as an 
electromagnetic field at rest though spatially oscillating.  There seems to be no such 
thing, however, neither on the basis of experience nor according to Maxwell’s equations.  
… One sees in this paradox the germ of the special theory of relativity…  (Einstein, 
1951) 
As John Norton explains (2013b), both the exact timing and content of Einstein’s youthful 
insight are open to question; quite likely Einstein, as do many of us, had gently revised his 
recollections decades after the events he describes.  In a much earlier account given by Einstein 
of this thought experiment (Norton, 2013b, pp. 130–31) he denied that he had, at age sixteen, a 
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clear notion of the constancy of the velocity of light; rather the function of the thought 
experiment for the young Einstein simply seems to have been that it raised a striking and 
suggestive question:  precisely what would one see if one could catch up with a light ray?  In this 
respect the light ray experiment is similar to Maxwell’s Demon—no clear conclusion, just a 
question.  Thus, we see that unlike Galileo’s thought experiment refuting the Aristotelian notion 
of variable rates of fall, which presents a rigorous reductio argument with a definite conclusion, 
thought experiments can contribute to advances in science simply by vividly directing attention 
to a problem that no one else seems to have worried about.    
It is easy for modern commentators to Whiggishly interpret the light ray experiment in 
the light of what is now known about relativity.  Prima facie, the post-1905 interpretation is as 
follows:  because all motion is relative, there should be no way to detect one’s velocity in any 
universal or absolute sense.  If I could catch up to a light beam then I would presumably see a 
pattern of standing waves; and if light waves move at a universal speed with respect to the 
hypothetical ether, which was supposed to be grounded in absolute space, then I would know my 
absolute velocity.  But even this line of thought is less clear than it first seems.  Einstein in his 
“Autobiographical Notes” claims that according to Maxwell’s equations there is no such thing as 
a standing light wave.  This was an odd thing for Einstein in the late 1940s to have said, since he 
must have known that there are indeed standing wave solutions of the field equations.  It is a 
question of having the right boundary conditions.  For instance, a standing electromagnetic wave 
can be set up between two mirrors facing each other.  Perhaps what Einstein had in mind was a 
free wave propagating in empty space—a highly idealized conception in itself.  Or perhaps what 
he meant was that there is no such thing as a single electromagnetic wave pattern that can be 
either standing or moving depending only upon an observer’s state of motion.  For whether or 
not an electromagnetic wave pattern is standing or travelling depends upon the phase 
relationships among its components, and phase relations are Lorentz covariant.  Thus, a wave 
pattern that is standing in one frame is standing in all.5  Post-1905, what the light ray experiment 
actually says is that there is no such thing as catching up to a travelling electromagnetic wave 
until it turns into a standing wave—although this is really a logical consequence of the constancy 
postulate for light and not a ground for the latter.   
As Norton (2013b) points out, there is good reason to think that the pre-1905 Einstein 
was not in fact targeting the ether theory of light, but rather the emission theory of light—the 
view that the speed of light depends upon the speed of its source.  If the light ray experiment is to 
be interpreted as an argument at all, Norton says, it is an argument against the emission theory, 
not the ether theory of light.   
Whatever Einstein may have had in mind at the age of sixteen or seventeen, the upshot is 
that by 1905 he had arrived at a theory in which Maxwell’s equations are taken as laws of nature 
                                                 
5 John Norton (private communication) has cautioned me to speak carefully here.  Consider standing 
waves between two facing mirrors.  The nodes are at rest with respect to the mirrors, and so of course 
they must move with respect to someone moving with respect to the mirrors.  However, everyone will 
agree that the wave pattern is standing with respect to the mirrors.   
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which are the same for all inertial frames of reference.  These equations predict the existence of 
electromagnetic waves that travel with an invariant velocity, for the speed of light is a constant 
in the equations.  Therefore, if Maxwell’s equations are laws of nature, the speed of light must 
be, in effect, a law of nature itself.  As such, it must be independent of an observer’s state of 
motion, even when one is moving arbitrarily close to the speed of light.  As Einstein 
demonstrated, this assumption leads to the Lorentz transformations.  Then if we wish to make 
kinematics and dynamics consistent with Maxwell, we have to make them Lorentz covariant as 
well.  If the round Maxwellian peg won’t go into the square Newtonian hole, the hole must be 
made round—and Einstein showed precisely how to do this.    
The light beam thought experiment illustrates an important feature of the way physical 
theories develop:  the intuitive or heuristic viewpoint that stimulated a new development in 
theory is sometimes not preserved by the time that the resulting theory is formalized.  The 
presumption that such formative intuitions must always be preserved in the formalized theory 
that flows historically from them has been dubbed by John Woods (2003) the “heuristic fallacy”.  
That this presumption is indeed often false is all the more clear when we grasp that thought 
experiments do not always contribute to the advancement of a science by serving as arguments 
for any particular proposition—at least not in ways that can be unambiguously reconstructed 
decades after the fact.  Einstein himself described his light ray thought experiment as “child-like” 
and said, “Discovery is not a work of logical thought, even if the final product is bound in logical 
form” (quoted in (Norton, 2013b, p. 130)).   
 
3.2 “The Happiest Thought of My Life” 
By 1907 special relativity was consolidated.  After another foray into quantum mechanics, in 
which he produced the first qualitatively correct quantum theory of specific heats and in effect 
founded modern solid state physics (Pais, 1982, Ch. 20), Einstein turned his attention to the 
problem of unifying gravitation with the principle of relativity.  The obvious barrier to writing a 
relativistic theory of gravitation was that Newton’s law of gravitation contains no dependency on 
time, and is therefore an action-at-a-distance theory (a fact that Newton himself had deplored (I. 
Newton, 1692)).  There was a subtler but no less fundamental problem with Newton’s theory:  in 
his picture it is entirely a coincidence that gravitational mass (the “charge” that appears in the 
force law) and inertial mass (the resistance of an object to an accelerating force) happen to be 
precisely the same quantity.  Einstein reports that in the course of writing a review article on 
relativity, he was suddenly struck by “the happiest thought of my life” (Pais, 1982, Ch. 9): 
The gravitational field has only a relative existence in a way similar to the electric field 
generated by magnetoelectric induction.  Because for an observer falling freely from the 
roof of a house there exists—at least in his immediate surroundings—no gravitational 
field. … Indeed, if the observer drops some bodies then these remain relative to him in a 
state of rest or uniform motion…  The observer therefore has the right to interpret his 
state as ‘at rest.’   
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Galileo’s observation that all bodies in a uniform gravitational field fall with the same 
acceleration (neglecting air resistance) thus takes on a “deep physical meaning”:  gravitation is 
therefore simply a manifestation of inertia, a “fictitious force” such as the centrifugal and 
Coriolis forces.  Most important for Einstein, this fact is a manifestation of the Principle of 
Relativity:   
if there were to exist just one single object that falls in the gravitational field in a way 
different from all the others, then with its help the observer could realize that he is 
[falling] in a gravitational field…”.  [This is] therefore a powerful argument for the fact 
that the relativity postulate has to be extended to coordinate systems which, relative to 
each other, are in non-uniform motion (in Pais, 1982, p. 178). 
On the basis of this thought experiment, Einstein formulated his Equivalence Principle, which 
expresses the equivalence of gravitation and acceleration:  an accelerated frame is equivalent to 
an inertial frame experiencing a gravitational field.6  The Equivalence Principle is often 
illustrated by the elevator thought experiment, which appears in his first exposition of relativity 
for the general readership, written and published in 1916 (Einstein, 1961).  If I am floating in the 
midst of in a windowless elevator car in free-fall, I have no way of telling from any 
measurements I can perform within the car whether it is falling freely in a uniform gravitational 
field, or moving inertially in deep space, far from all matter.  (Out of a commendable concern for 
the safety of the experimenter, Einstein advises that he “fasten himself with strings to the floor” 
(Einstein, 1961, p. 66).)  If there is a rocket engine attached to the base of the elevator car, and I 
am held to the floor of the car by a constant force, I have no way of telling whether the rocket is 
burning with constant thrust, or whether I am sitting on the surface of a large planet whose 
gravitational field is such as to generate a uniform acceleration equal to that of the rocket.   
The idea that gravitation is an inertial force is simple and beautiful; it had to be right.  
However, it was incompatible with the long-held presumptions (which Kant thought were a 
priori) that space has to be Euclidean and time has to be absolute.  This was apparent to Einstein 
in at least two ways, which again can be illustrated with elegant thought experiments.   
First, go back to the elevator car sitting on the surface of a spherical planet.  Small test 
masses will fall toward the centre of mass of the planet; thus, two test masses released side by 
side will move toward each other as they fall.  Now, the gravitational potential is a function of 
the distance from the centre of mass of the planet.  Therefore, two test masses released one above 
the other will tend to move apart from each other when they are released and allowed to fall 
freely.  (The one closer to the centre of mass falls with greater acceleration.)  The tendency for 
freely falling matter to be stretched radially and squeezed tangentially is called the toothpaste 
tube effect.  It can be described as a manifestation of tidal forces, which are due to differences in 
gravitational potential from point to point.  A gravitational field can be detected by the tidal 
                                                 
6 There are several readings of the Equivalence Principle; one must in particular distinguish between what 
Einstein himself seems to have had in mind, which he expressed in more than one way during the years in 
which he developed General Relativity, and the way it is used in modern formulations of the theory.   See 
(Anderson, 1967; Misner, Thorne, & Wheeler, 1973; Norton, 1986).   
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accelerations it produces (which, again, become vanishingly small within a small enough region 
of spacetime).  Here is the catch:  if we want to follow the Equivalence Principle and insist that 
the test particles are moving inertially, and if we accept that inertial motion follows the shortest 
paths (the “geodesics”) in a geometry, then we are forced to the conclusion that in the presence 
of gravity the geometry of space (more precisely, spacetime) cannot be Euclidean—for in a 
Euclidean geometry the inertial paths would be parallel.7   
Second (and here is yet another thought experiment), Einstein considered a circular disk 
rotating with uniform angular velocity about its centre.  Those portions of the disk not at the 
centre will be Lorentz-contracted in the tangential direction with respect to the centre; the 
Euclidean relationship between the circumference and diameter of the circle will therefore fail.   
In this way the Equivalence Principle combined with well-established conclusions from 
special relativity led Einstein to the realization that in order to fulfill his ambition to create a 
fully relativistic theory of gravitation, he would have to radically alter the geometry of 
spacetime.  It might have been less intellectually risky to give up on the notion of gravitation as a 
manifestation of inertia, but Einstein boldly grasped the second horn of the dilemma and (under 
Marcel Grossman’s tutelage) taught himself the requisite mathematics—Riemannian geometry 
and tensor analysis.  Thus it was that a theory that was sparked by beautifully intuitive and 
simple thought experiments quickly acquired mathematical complexity so daunting that in 1913 
Max von Laue (who had made a key contribution to general relativity by defining the 10-
component stress-energy tensor) wrote of the “extraordinary, in fact inconceivable complexity” 
of the nascent theory as a reason for rejecting it (quoted in (Gutfreund & Renn, 2015, p. 115)). 
The rest is (complicated) history:  after a number of false starts, Einstein perfected his 
field equations of gravitation in late 1915.  They received their first experimental confirmation 
with Eddington’s famous eclipse expedition of 1919 that showed Einstein’s prediction of the 
bending of starlight near the limb of the Sun to be correct (to within, at that time, a rather large 
margin of error).  The theory has since then survived every observational test to which it could 
be subjected.  While few experts doubt that general relativity must eventually be replaced with a 
quantum theory of spacetime, it remains the limit toward which such theories must converge 
within its very large realm of applicability, just as general relativity itself had to converge to the 
Newtonian picture where the latter is applicable.   
Einstein devoted the larger part of his later research efforts to formulating a unified field 
theory that would, in principle, provide a geometric picture of all forces in nature (Sauer, 2014).  
In very simple terms, the idea of the unified field theory was to see whether every sort of force 
could be inertial.  This implies further leaps in the complexity of spacetime geometry.  It is clear 
by now that it is impossible to fully account for the structure and behaviour of elementary 
particles without taking quantum mechanics into account.  Einstein’s later attempted unified field 
theories were all classical—local, continuous, and deterministic—and are now generally 
                                                 
7 For an exceptionally clear and user-friendly explanation of how these thought experiments imply the 
curvature of space-time, see (Norton, 2015a).   
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considered to be magnificent failures (Pais, 1982, Ch. 17).  Perhaps the fact that they were not 
guided by any clear, intuitive thought experiments had something to do with this.   
 
3.3 Holes in Spacetime 
We need to also take a quick look at Einstein’s “hole” argument, which played a key role in 
Einstein’s tortuous route to the final form of his field equations for gravitation.  There is a large 
literature on this subject, much of it dealing with issues beyond the scope of this paper.  (See 
(Janssen, 2014; Norton, 2015b; Stachel, 2014).)  What we need to do here is, again, see the 
simple, intuitive picture that guided Einstein—or in this case, almost misguided him.    
 By 1912 Einstein had nearly succeeded in formulating the gravitational field equations 
that he would publish three years later.  However, he was stymied by two difficulties, one 
technical, the other conceptual.  The technical problem was that the field equations he and 
Grossman had constructed did not seem to reduce to the Newtonian picture when they should 
have.  This glitch disappeared by the time Einstein arrived at the correct equations, but it led him 
to question whether it would be possible to find field equations that were generally covariant.  
He formulated his “hole” argument in order to show that the field equations could not be 
expected to be generally covariant, but the argument instead helped him to clarify the meaning of 
the concept of covariance. 
 General covariance was intended by Einstein to be an extension of the special-relativistic 
Principle of Relativity to all possible states of relative motion.  Philosophically, general 
covariance is an expression of Einstein’s realism, which implies among other things that physical 
realities are not affected merely by how we choose to describe them.  In practice, Einstein 
thought, this would mean that a mere coordinate transformation should make no difference to the 
observable predictions that we should be able to extract from the theory; therefore, the form of 
the equations of the theory should be preserved by any smooth (continuous and differentiable) 
mathematical transformation.  Transforming from one coordinate system to another—for 
instance, transforming from Cartesian to polar coordinates—should make no difference to what 
it is that the coordinates are being used to describe.  The methods of differential geometry 
pioneered by Gauss and Riemann were thus ideal for Einstein’s purposes, since they enable one 
to make a distinction between intrinsic properties of a geometric structure (such as curvature) 
and extrinsic properties which are purely an artifact of the choice of reference frame or 
coordinate system.   
 But would it be possible to write a generally covariant theory of gravitation that satisfied 
the Equivalence Principle, which implies that the mass-energy structure of spacetime determines 
the inertial paths of matter?  Einstein asked what would happen if there were a hole in spacetime, 
a bounded vacuole containing nothing that could serve as a source of the gravitational field; i.e., 
no matter, energy, fields, or particles whatsoever.  If determinism holds, the field inside the hole 
should be fixed in a unique way by the matter outside it.  Presumably we can extend our 
coordinate grid to cover the hole.  Now, apply a smooth transformation to the grid-points inside 
the hole (but not those outside it).  This should transform the gravitational field inside the hole, 
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since the field is a function of the metric structure.  By general covariance, both the original and 
the transformed coordinates should be equally acceptable descriptions of the situation inside the 
hole.  And yet, one seems to have two distinct field structures that are somehow a consequence 
of the same mass-energy distribution.  Given the stark choice between abandoning determinism 
or general covariance, Einstein chose the latter.   
 Einstein seems to have been briefly satisfied with his hobbled field equations of 1913, but 
it became increasingly apparent that they were not observationally adequate.  Spurred by 
competition from David Hilbert, Einstein returned to general covariance and in late 1915 arrived 
at the set of field equations that so far remain by far the best theory of spacetime structure we 
have.  In 1916 Einstein set aside worries about holes in spacetime by arguing that the only things 
that can actually be observed are coincidences in space and time between “material points”: 
All our space-time verifications invariably amount to a determination of space-time 
coincidences (2015, pp. 187–188). 
These are the only things that we actually observe and so our theory should be built out of them; 
how we paint coordinates onto those observable point-coincidence events should make no 
difference to the physics we describe.  Carlo Rovelli puts it in more modern terms: 
Reality is not made up of particles and fields on a spacetime:  it is made up of particles 
and fields … that can only be localized with respect to one another.  No more fields on 
spacetime:  just fields on fields (2004, p. 71). 
In short, the best answer to Einstein’s “hole” argument is that the notion of an entirely matter-
free hole in spacetime has no physical meaning.  If a cosmological constant is admitted (as it 
must be) then even empty space itself has a gossamer “dark energy”, but one need not invoke the 
cosmological constant to see the point.  By about 1920 Einstein himself acknowledged (Einstein, 
1922) that the old ether of the 19th century is reborn in general relativity as a dynamic substance 
ultimately indistinguishable from the matter that lives within it.  As the distinguished relativist 
Bryce DeWitt explained,  
General relativity not only restores dynamical properties to empty space but also ascribes 
to it energy, momentum and angular momentum.  In principle, gravitational radiation 
could be used as a propellant.  Since gravitational waves are merely ripples on the 
curvature of spacetime, an anti-etherist would have to describe a spaceship using this 
propellant as getting something for nothing—achieving acceleration simply by ejecting 
one hard vacuum into another.  This example is not as absurd as it sounds.  It is not 
difficult to estimate that a star undergoing asymmetric (octopole) collapse may achieve a 
net velocity change of the order of 100 to 200 km s-1 by this means (DeWitt, 1979, p. 
681).8   
Will the warp-drive spacecraft of the future climb to the stars on jets of pure ether?   
                                                 
8 Note that DeWitt’s account of space as capable of possessing momentum is in interesting tension with 
what Einstein said in 1920:  “[A]ccording to the general theory of relativity space is endowed with 
physical qualities; in this sense, therefore, there exists an ether. … But this ether may not be thought of as 
endowed with the quality characteristic of ponderable media, as consisting of parts which may be tracked 
through time.  The idea of motion may not be applied to it” (1922, pp. 23–24). 
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4. The Role of Thought Experiments in Einstein’s Discoveries 
Obviously, Einstein’s discoveries were not based purely on thought experiments.  By 1905 he 
was almost certainly aware of the negative result of the real experiment done by Michelson and 
Morley9 though he does not mention it by name in “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies” 
(Einstein, 1905).  Rather, he begins his great paper by objecting to the redundancy and 
arbitrariness in the way that Maxwell’s electrodynamics was “usually understood”10 at the time.  
In particular, he disliked the fact that the induction of a current in a conductor by a magnetic 
field was described in different ways depending upon whether the conductor or the magnet were 
presumed to be at rest, even though the observable effects depend only upon the relative motion 
of the two.  (As several authors have pointed out, this simple consideration in itself constitutes an 
elegant thought experiment.)  Einstein was guided by his acute sense of logical economy as 
much as his physical intuition.  But of course, one should not under-rate Einstein’s “muscles of 
intuition”11 when he was in the “prime of his age for invention.”12  Einstein trained those 
muscles during his years in the patent office, where he was constantly required to analyse how 
alleged inventions were actually supposed to work.13  As Peter Galison documents (2003), many 
of these inventions were concerned with the measurement of time or the determination of 
synchrony.   
The role of many of Einstein’s thought experiments such as the light beam chase in the 
formation of his theories seems to have been essentially suggestive, not logical.  A comparison 
can be made with August Kekulé’s apocryphal vision of a snake swallowing its tail, which he 
claimed led him to grasp that benzene has a ring structure.14 Just as Kekulé envisioned a physical 
structure, thought experiments such as the light beam chase lead us to picture an argument 
structure; that is, they don’t always constitute an argument, but they suggest one.  Consider 
Einstein’s “happiest thought”; in itself, it was simply an observation that a person falling freely 
in a uniform gravitational field would not feel a force due to gravitation.  Much of the impact of 
this observation for Einstein, from his personal accounts of the event, seems to have been its 
affect; seeing the point of the experiment (that gravitation is remarkably like an inertial force) 
was like grasping the punch-line of a good joke.  (Einstein was known for his often-raffish sense 
of humour.)  There is a sense of pleasant surprise, of immediate certainty, like Martin Gardner’s 
aha! moment when you get the trick that solves a problem (1978).  A good thought experiment 
has the effect of an instantaneous paradigm shift:  staring at the duck for a long time, you finally 
                                                 
9 Pais (1982, Ch. 6) marshals evidence to this effect.   
10 Quotation from (Stachel, 2005, p. 123) 
11 Keynes’ famous phrase (Keynes, 1978) applies to the young Einstein as much as Newton. 
12 This is adapted from the phrase that Newton applied to himself during that fertile period when he 
created the differential calculus and laid down the elements of his mechanics (S. I. Newton, 1888). 
13 A. Fölsing:  “…for young Albert Einstein, examining patents was more than just a livelihood… His 
virtuosity with ‘mental experiments’ was not all that far removed from intellectual penetration of an 
invention…” (1997, p. 103). 
14 See (Martin, 1997, pp. 165–167).  Kekulé proclaimed (perhaps with tongue in cheek), “Let us learn to 
dream, gentlemen, then perhaps we shall find the truth.” 
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see the rabbit (Kuhn, 1970).  It is, in itself, not an argument but a perception that suggests an 
argument.  Almost everyone has fallen or jumped off of something at some time; only Einstein 
noticed the implications.  Pasteur famously said that chance favours the prepared mind; so, also, 
do thought experiments.   
 
5. Thought Experiments in Quantum Mechanics 
With the advent of quantum mechanics, physics moved away from the intuitive and the 
visualizable.  Nevertheless, some notable thought experiments played key roles in the growth of 
quantum theory.  There is not space to analyse all of them here in detail.  I’ll make just a few 
comments about the virtual oscillators that Planck used to justify his blackbody radiation law, 
another elegant model by Einstein which he used in 1909 to demonstrate the wave-particle 
duality of light, and Heisenberg’s microscope and the role it did or did not play in his derivation 
of the Uncertainty Relations in 1927.  I’ll have a lot more to say about the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) thought experiment and the lead-up to it.   
 
5.1 Planck’s Resonators 
In late 1900 Max Planck finally accepted that he had to adopt Ludwig Boltzmann’s discrete 
counting methods in order to find a derivation for the radiation formula that he had stumbled 
upon by a combination of interpolation and inspired guesswork a few weeks earlier.  But he 
needed the most general possible model he could devise for the interaction of matter and the 
radiation field.  In 1900, of course, virtually nothing was known of the detailed structure of 
matter; furthermore, the whole point of the calculation was to arrive at a formula that would be 
valid for any kind of material whatsoever (for the only defining characteristic of a perfect black 
body is that it absorbs all the radiation that hits it).  So Planck imagined that radiation exchanges 
energy with “virtual” harmonic oscillators or resonators in the walls of the radiation cavity.  
Planck’s virtual oscillators were “spherical chickens,” shorn of all detail except the physically 
plausible assumption that they could somehow come into resonance with incident radiation.  But 
the model was not enough; in order to get the right formula, Planck had to commit what he called 
an “act of desperation” (Stone, 2013, p. 59) and assume that radiation exchanged energy with the 
resonators in discrete chunks of magnitude E=hν, where ν is the frequency of the incident light 
and h is a new constant of nature.15  Thus was quantum mechanics born, though it would take 
over twenty years more (and much hard work by the “valiant Swabian” and others) before it was 
widely accepted that the radiation field itself is quantized. 
Should Planck’s story about his virtual resonators count as a thought experiment, or just 
as an apt model on which a calculation could be hung?  Models can be of specialized systems of 
narrow interest, while a game-changing thought experiment focusses attention on a key feature 
                                                 
15 John Norton (private communication):  “The amazing result in thermodynamics is that if systems A and 
B are in equilibrium, all that matters for A about B is B’s temperature. … Whatever properties the matter 
may have, the equilibrium state of the radiation will be the same.”  So Planck needed only the sketchiest 
picture of matter, combined with the assumption of quantization, to get his result.   
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of wide generality and suggests what calculations must be done in a large class of cases.  Planck 
used his model to ask, what are the most general features of the way in which radiation must 
interact with any conceivable kind of matter?  It was simply mathematics that forced Planck to 
introduce energy quantization, because that was the only way he could get the right answer.  
Quantization for Planck was simply a formal step, for which he could not see any independent 
physical justification.  The defining features of Planck’s model were not by themselves sufficient 
to point to the solution of the problem he set it, but the simplicity and generality of the model 
clarified the question to the extent that it left Planck only one mathematical option.  For this 
reason I’m happy to count Planck’s resonator model as one of the most consequential thought 
experiments of the new physics.   
 
5.2 Of Fluctuations and Mirrors 
Now we turn to another ingenious scenario by Einstein which certainly does count as a thought 
experiment of the first order (although it requires a good knowledge of statistical mechanics to 
fully appreciate it).  In 1909 Einstein imagined a mirror inside a Planckian cavity, able to travel 
back and forth freely on a rail perpendicular to its face (Einstein, 1909; Pais, 1982, pp. 408–409; 
Stone, 2013, pp. 136–140).  In the cavity is a quantity of ideal gas and radiation, all in 
equilibrium at a definite temperature.  What we do next is Einsteinian simplicity at its best:  ask 
what is required for the mirror to be in equilibrium with the gas and radiation—for it must be.  
But this thought experiment is no mere dazzling aperçu.  Einstein applied his mastery of the 
statistics of fluctuations, which he had exhibited in his work in 1905 on Brownian motion, and 
derived a key formula for the radiation fluctuations that the mirror must experience in order to 
remain in equilibrium.  The mirror is subject to pressure fluctuations both from the gas and from 
the radiation, and the gas and radiation fluctuations must be in equilibrium with each other.  The 
new thing Einstein did was to use Planck’s blackbody energy distribution formula to compute the 
fluctuations due to radiation.  Planck gives the energy distribution at the given temperature in 
terms of frequency, which shows the energy flux to which the mirror is subject.  Then the 
crowning touch:  Einstein imagined the mirror to be transparent to all frequencies except a 
narrow band; using Planck’s Law for the energy density in that band, he arrived at an expression 
for the root-mean square fluctuations in the position of the mirror due to what he called 
“radiative friction.”  The key result was that this expression contains two terms.  One represents 
wave-like fluctuations caused by constructive and destructive interference, due to small 
variations in phase, polarization, and frequency.  (In modern terms, the light in the cavity would 
be said to be incoherent.)  The other has the form of fluctuations due to impacts from discrete 
bundles of energy of magnitude hν.  At low radiation densities, the particle-like fluctuations 
strongly dominate.  Einstein took this result, which is a direct consequence of Planck’s well-
verified distribution law, as good evidence for his view that “the next state of theoretical physics 
will bring us a theory of light that can be understood as a kind of fusion of the wave and 
emission [particle] theories of light” (in (Stone, 2013, p. 137)).   
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5.3 Heisenberg’s Microscope 
This is not the place to recount the whole story of how modern quantum mechanics burst on the 
scene from 1925 to 1927.  (For a short version see (Peacock, 2008); for exhaustive detail, see 
(Mehra & Rechenberg, 1982).)   By 1927, it was clear that the new quantum theory challenged 
classical intuitions in a number of related ways.  Schrödinger had created wave mechanics in 
1926, hoping that it would give a realistic, classical underpinning to quantum statistics.  And yet, 
it soon became apparent that QM only gives us probabilities, which are calculated indirectly 
from the (complex-valued) wave function by means of the Born Rule, 𝑃(𝑥) = |Υ(𝑥)2|.  What, 
then, did Υ(𝑥), which Einstein sarcastically dubbed the Gerspensterfelder (ghost field), actually 
represent?  The one thing that Schrödinger’s theory did not do was get rid of what he called the 
“damned quantum jumps” (Stone, 2013, p. 268); rather, it simply gave a remarkably efficient set 
of algorithms for using the “ghost field” to calculate the probabilities that those jumps would 
occur.  Why these algorithms work so well remained (and remains) a mystery.   
Another profound mystery was the appearance of non-factorability (or non-
factorizability, as it is sometimes more awkwardly called).  As soon as two or more particles 
undergo some sort of dynamical interaction, the wave function for the combined multiparticle 
system has cross-terms which imply much stronger statistical interdependencies between the 
particles than seemed to be possible.  These cross-terms are in general algebraically irreducible 
(except for the special and limited case of so-called product states); once the particles have 
interacted their observable properties remain closely correlated (or anti-correlated) even when 
the particles have separated to arbitrary distances.  Schrödinger (1935b) coined the term 
“entanglement” (from the German, Verschränkung) to describe this mysterious interdependency 
of non-factorable systems, and famously stated,  
When two systems, of which we know the states by their respective representatives [wave 
functions], enter into a temporary physical interaction … and when after a time the 
systems separate again, then they can no longer be described … by endowing each of 
them with a representative of its own. I would call that not one but rather the 
characteristic trait of quantum mechanics.  (1935, p. 555) 
A remarkable property of entangled states is that, as Schrödinger suggested, the individual 
particles in an entangled state cannot be represented as pure states, only as mixtures (classical 
ensembles of quantum states).  They are not “things in themselves”!  Einstein hated this feature 
of quantum mechanics, and he was convinced that it marked a fundamental flaw in the theory. 
 In 1927 Einstein attempted to construct his own version of wave mechanics (Howard, 
2007).   His aim was to produce a wave mechanics without the pesky cross-terms, and he failed 
because it cannot be done.  The short paper he produced was presented at a meeting but remained 
unpublished (Einstein, 1927).  It was his last attempt to make a constructive contribution to 
quantum mechanics—and definitely not up to his usual standard.16   
 In the same year Werner Heisenberg introduced his indeterminacy relations.  Heisenberg 
was a complex and contradictory character.  His ethically dubious participation in the Nazi 
                                                 
16 See Peter Holland (2005) for a detailed analysis of Einstein’s abortive 1927 wave mechanics.   
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atomic project during WWII (Rose, 1998) sadly tarnishes the brilliance of his contributions to 
theoretical physics in his dazzling youth, when he laid down the essential principles of modern 
quantum mechanics at the age of 23.   
The central epistemological problem that quantum mechanics will not permit us to ignore 
is that it is impossible to observe and measure the properties of a particle without physically 
interacting with it.  Einstein based special relativity on operational definitions of quantities such 
as position and time, constructed so that it would be possible to clearly distinguish between these 
apparent properties of objects that are partially due to the way they are observed and those that 
are intrinsic to the objects.  Quantum mechanics forces us to ask whether the notion of intrinsic 
properties has any physical meaning at all.   
To investigate this problem, Heisenberg imagined a microscope designed to detect the 
position and velocity of an electron by scattering gamma rays off it (Heisenberg, 1927, 1930).  
By the wave-particle duality both electrons and gamma rays have both a wave and a particle 
aspect.  It is necessary to use high-energy gamma rays since there is an inverse relationship 
between wavelength and energy:  the lower the wavelength the higher the resolving power of a 
microscope, so that only high energy electromagnetic radiation has a short enough wavelength to 
detect an electron within any reasonable range of error.  The key idea of the thought experiment 
was to apply basic laws of optics to show that the more accurately one could resolve the 
momentum of the electron, the less accurately one could resolve its position, and vice versa.  
Heisenberg arrived at the now-familiar inequality, 
∆𝑥∆𝑝𝑥 ≥ ℎ, 
where the deltas are the uncertainties in position x and momentum px, and h is Planck’s constant 
of action.  We can’t measure one of the deltas with full precision without rendering the other 
completely indefinite.   
Are the indeterminacy relations merely epistemic, a reflection of our practical inability to 
know the precise values of quantities that are, in fact, pre-existent?  The microscope experiment 
itself suggests that these endemic uncertainties are merely the product of the fact that we cannot 
avoid using very short wavelength radiation to “see” an electron; because of the inverse relation 
between wavelength and energy, the more accurately we want to detect the position of the target 
particle, the more we must change its momentum.   This epistemic reading of the thought 
experiment seems to leave open the possibility that the electron may still have well-defined 
values of both position and momentum even if we can never hope to simultaneously measure 
them.  The problem, one might think, is only that there is no procedure in which we could reduce 
our “jiggling” of the observed system to zero.   
 Heisenberg realized that there are both mathematical and philosophical grounds for 
rejecting this naïve interpretation of the indeterminacy relations.  Mathematically, observable 
quantities come in conjugate pairs defined by commutation relations which show precisely the 
extent to which the commutative law fails for the linear operators representing those observables.  
Shortly after Heisenberg’s publication of the indeterminacy rules, Schrödinger and others 
showed that they are simply a mathematical consequence of the commutation relations between 
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position and momentum (Cohen-Tannoudji, Diu, & Laloë, 1977, pp. 286–287).  According to the 
mathematical formalism that emerged in the years 1926–30, this inability to simultaneously tie 
down both values of a conjugate pair is not merely due to unavoidable experimental clumsiness 
due to the finitude of the quantum of action.  Rather, in the mathematics of wave mechanics, 
asking for simultaneous, exact values of position and momentum is a mathematical contradiction 
in terms, like asking for a square circle (because position and momentum are Fourier transforms 
of each other).  Philosophically, Niels Bohr argued that this was a manifestation of what he 
called complementarity:  the types of experiments in which one can measure position are simply 
incompatible with the types of experiments in which one can measure momentum.  We need 
both wave and particle viewpoints to fully describe physics, and yet at the quantum level these 
two modalities cannot be applied simultaneously—where “simultaneously” does not necessarily 
mean “at the same time coordinate” but “in the same procedure”.  Thus, the microscope thought 
experiment is not a way of rigorously deriving the indeterminacy rules from the formal principles 
of quantum theory, but rather a highly suggestive semi-classical approximation.17   
 
5.4 Einstein Challenges Quantum Mechanics 
Einstein remained stubbornly convinced that the properties of physical systems could not depend 
upon the types of measurements we choose to perform on them, especially if those properties 
could be inferred from measurements performed at a distance.  He referred to Bohrian 
complementarity as the “tranquillizing philosophy—or religion?” which, he said, “is so 
delicately contrived that, for the time being, it provides a gentle pillow for the true believer from 
which he cannot very easily be aroused” (Fine, 1986, p. 19).  
In 1927–30, Einstein brought the full force of his ingenuity to bear on quantum 
mechanics and the indeterminacy relations in particular, trying to devise thought experiments in 
which they could be shown to fail.  For once his inventiveness failed him; Bohr and others were 
always able to find loophole in Einstein’s arguments that saved Heisenberg.  (See Bohr et al., 
“The Bohr-Einstein Dialogue,” in (Wheeler & Zurek, 1983, pp. 1–50).)   
By 1935 Einstein had given up on trying to beat the indeterminacy relations and tried a 
much subtler approach.  In that year he and two younger collaborators, Boris Podolsky and 
Nathan Rosen, published a short, difficult paper (Einstein et al., 1935) in which they outlined an 
enigmatic thought experiment aimed at showing that quantum mechanics cannot provide a 
complete description of the entities for which it purports to account.  The Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) gedankenexperiment has evolved from a hypothetical scenario to become a 
defining paradigm of modern quantum mechanics.18     
                                                 
17 Heisenberg’s rules are also often called the uncertainty relations.  However, as Richard Arthur (private 
communication) has pointed out to me, the latter term is potentially misleading since it suggests that the 
Heisenberg rules merely represent epistemic uncertainty about quantities that do, in fact, have definite 
values.   
18 There is not space in this paper to consider yet another thought experiment of Einstein’s, the box 
experiment, which makes essentially the same point as the EPR experiment.  See (Norsen, 2005). 
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We have already mentioned two features of quantum mechanics that were the most 
troubling to Einstein, noncommutativity and the indeterminacy relations that follow from them.  
Non-commutativity plays an important role in the EPR experiment.  However, as Don Howard 
says (2007), “[E]ntanglement, not indeterminacy, was the chief source of Einstein’s misgivings 
about quantum mechanics…  Indeterminacy was but a symptom; entanglement was the 
underlying disease.”   
The aim of the EPR paper was not to show that QM is incorrect, but rather that it is 
incomplete in the sense that it does not give a description of every “element of physical reality” 
(“EPR” again) belonging to an entangled state.  By this time, Einstein had decided that the 
indeterminacy relations of Heisenberg point to nothing more than the incompleteness of quantum 
mechanics itself (incompleteness in the sense that the theory fails to represent properties that 
particles presumably do have).  Part of the aim of the EPR paper was to make this notion of 
completeness precise.  A necessary condition for completeness, according to EPR, is that “every 
element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in the physical theory” (777).  And their 
sufficient condition for reality was this:  “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can 
predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a quantity, then there 
exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity” (777).  The 
argumentative strategy for the paper would be to use the sufficiency condition for reality to show 
that quantum mechanics fails the necessary condition for completeness.   
Here is the gist of the argument.  Consider a composite system U + V comprised of two 
particles which interacted dynamically at one point and then separated far from each other in 
space.  Because they interacted they will possess quantities (such as total momentum or 
difference in position) that must be conserved globally.  EPR take pains to show that these 
quantities commute on the system as a whole.  This fact is crucial to the argument, since the 
mutually consistent global conservation requirements give us a basis for comparing the results of 
apparently incompatible measurement procedures on the individual particles.   
Now, measure (say) position on U at time t. This collapses the entangled state into a 
product state with V in an eigenstate of position, allowing us to predict its position with certainty.  
(As Schrödinger put it, this “steers” the V-system into a definite state.)  But we could have also 
measured momentum on U at time t, and this would collapse the entangled state into a product 
with V in an eigenstate of momentum at time t, allowing us to predict its momentum with 
certainty.  We can’t measure both position and momentum on U in the same procedure, but we 
are entirely at liberty at time t to choose which of the two types of procedures to apply.  Thus, 
measurements we can perform on U enable us to predict presumably non-commuting properties 
of V with certainty.  Therefore, there seems to be only two possibilities: either V was already in 
definite states of both position and momentum (despite Heisenberg), or our choice of 
measurement strategy on U at time t spookily influenced the state of V—at time t!  But EPR say 
(780), “no reasonable definition of reality could be expected to permit this,” precisely because U 
and V are spatially distant at time t.  Therefore, quantum mechanics must be incomplete since by 
its own admission it cannot represent properties that system V must have already had at time t.   
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The EPR argument thus establishes (validly) a disjunction:  either QM is incomplete (in 
the sense they specify) or there is spooky action (or perhaps both!).   
EPR illustrated their argument by applying it in detail to an entangled wave function 
which has some very interesting properties which I won't attempt to analyze here except to note 
that there seems to be no practical way to prepare particles in this particular state; thus the EPR 
experiment, as they described it in 1935, is a pure Gedankenexperiment.  Later, practicable 
versions of the experiment would be defined.   
Niels Bohr rushed to publish a response (1935).  He agreed with EPR that “of course 
there is in a case like that just considered there is no question of a mechanical disturbance of the 
system under investigation during the last critical stage of the measuring procedure” (699).  
However, one cannot hope for a single complete description of the system.  Rather, there are 
complementary descriptions of the system; in one, we can infer the momentum of V from 
momentum measurements on U, and in the other we can infer the position of V from position 
measurements on U.  But from these facts we cannot infer a pre-existent reality in which V 
possessed sharp values of both position and momentum, for one cannot infer sharp values of both 
position and momentum for particle V with a single procedure.  To ask for anything else would 
be to ask a foolish question, as Feshbach and Weisskopf put it (1988):  “If you ask an 
inappropriate question, you get a probability distribution as a response.”  Thus, Bohr’s cryptic 
and complicated response to some extent does clarify what the quantum mechanics of 1935 
actually says about the EPR scenario, but it is very difficult to avoid the suspicion that a deeper 
level of analysis is possible—even if it would not be precisely what either EPR or Bohr 
themselves likely had in mind.19  Indeed, J. S. Bell would later show that this is the case.   
It is often said that EPR argued for a “hidden variable” or “hidden parameter” account of 
QM (although they did not use those terms themselves).  Einstein in later years stated that he 
thought that there should be an ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics (1969, p. 668), 
which he apparently understood as a probability distribution over possible local states of the 
particles.  The idea would be that the particles have some sort of complex internal coding 
(perhaps still far beyond the ken of our present physical theories) which is capable of telling 
them how to behave in order to obey the observed predictions of quantum mechanics, for all of 
the possible experimental questions they could be asked.   
This notion of hidden variables can be compared to heredity.  Why do siblings resemble 
each other?  Not because of anything “spooky,” but because of a common local cause, namely 
the shared DNA they got from their parents.  Although the role of DNA in heredity was not 
understood in 1935, EPR in effect implied (although they did not explicitly state) that there has 
to be some sort of “quantum DNA” encoded in the entangled particles when they interacted at 
their common source, sufficient to explain how the particles react when they are measured.  In 
1935 there was no obvious way to test this proposal.  And so there matters stayed until after 
WWII.  
                                                 
19 See (Howard, 2007) for an insightful analysis of what was at stake between Bohr and EPR.   
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The EPR thought experiment is widely misunderstood.  Its import was not to demonstrate 
the existence of entanglement, but rather to use entanglement as evidence that quantum 
mechanics could not be telling the whole story about the structure of particles.  The non-
factorability of wave functions for multi-particle systems had been well-known as early as 1927 
(Howard, 2007), although Schrödinger did not introduce the term “entanglement” until 1935.  
Einstein himself had grasped that light quanta were suspiciously too-well correlated from the 
time of his pre-1910 pioneering papers on the statistics of electromagnetic radiation.  The EPR 
paper did have the valuable effect of drawing attention to the phenomenon of entanglement in a 
way that its challenge to conventional notions of locality and causality could not be ignored.  Via 
the work of Bell (shortly to be described), the EPR thought experiment was one of the key sparks 
for the modern flowering of quantum information theory.  Thus, even though the paper did not 
accomplish what its authors hoped it would accomplish, it has proven to be one of the most 
provocative and unexpectedly fruitful of Einstein’s great papers.   
 
5.5 How the EPR Debate Might Have Gone 
It seems hard to imagine that anything useful could be added to the reams of analysis of the EPR 
paper that have already appeared, and yet one essential question has received very little attention.  
Is it actually the case that there is no dynamical interaction between the two particles “during the 
last critical stage of the measuring procedure”?  Both Bohr and Einstein themselves thought that 
this question did not even merit discussion, and numerous papers published since their time 
purporting to demonstrate “signal locality” in entangled states simply follow their lead and 
assume without argument that entangled systems are dynamically local.20  The bald assumption 
that spacelike separation guarantees dynamical independence (Einstein’s Trennungsprinzip, his 
Separation Principle) (Einstein, 1948) seems so utterly reasonable to most authors that very few 
have thought seriously to question it.  And yet, whether or not the separation principle is correct 
is one of the first questions that should have been examined, not the last.   
Had Einstein and other protagonists in the mid-1930s noticed a short remark by Pauli, 
published in 1933, the debate over the EPR scenario could have taken a different direction.21  In 
a review article on quantum mechanics Pauli includes a discussion of many-particle systems.  He 
notes that when there is no mutual interaction between the particles the system is represented by 
a wave function which is simply the product of individual wave functions belonging to the 
individual particles.  Pauli seems to suggest that in order for such a wave function to be a 
solution of the Schrödinger Equation for the system, the algebraic structure of the Hamiltonian 
(energy operator) must be parallel to the algebraic structure of the state function.  For a product 
state, the total Hamiltonian must be additive (i.e., simply the sum of the Hamiltonians for the 
individual particles):   
                                                 
20 E.g., (Ghirardi, Rimini, & Weber, 1980; Shimony, 1983).  For critiques of the orthodox approach to 
signal locality, see (Kennedy, 1995; Mittelstaedt, 1998; Peacock, 1992). 
21 My attention was drawn to this important passage in Pauli’s book by an unpublished presentation by 
Don Howard (2006).  
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An additive decomposition of the Hamiltonian into independent summands corresponds 
[entsprich] therefore, to a product decomposition of the wave function into independent 
factors.22 
Pauli does not directly comment on the Hamiltonian structure for non-product (non-factorable) 
states, but this pregnant remark raises questions that should have been obvious even in 1935.  
Does Pauli’s entsprich mean that a state is a product state if and only if its Hamiltonian is 
additive?  If so, then many-particle systems represented by non-factorable wave functions (such 
as the special entangled wave-function used as an example by EPR) would have to have non-
additive Hamiltonians with algebraically irreducible cross-terms.  If that is the case, then for any 
entangled state there must in general be eigenvalues (energy states) of the total system 
Hamiltonian that are not simply sums of local energy states for the individual particles; let’s call 
this the energy of entanglement.  Such nonlocal energy eigenstates would be properties of the 
entangled system as a whole, rather like the way in which the energy of an atomic orbital is a 
property of the orbital as a whole and cannot be spoken of as localized to the electrons associated 
with the orbital.  It is unclear whether the existence of such non-localized energies can be 
sensibly described as implying any sort of “action” at a distance, but their existence would be a 
clear challenge to Einstein’s dynamically-local realism because they it would mean that the 
particles in an entangled state are dynamically entailed no matter how far apart they are.    
Nothing I’ve said here is meant to suggest that Pauli himself would have been an 
advocate of such a flagrant challenge to relativistic orthodoxy.  One can surmise from his own 
dismissive remarks about the EPR paper23 that he did not think that the EPR argument merited 
close analysis.  Whatever Pauli may have thought, however, there is increasing evidence, both 
theoretical and experimental, for dynamical nonlocality in entangled states.  This is not the place 
to review that evidence in detail; suffice to say that the question of dynamic nonseparability in 
entangled states—and thus the ultimate interpretation of the EPR thought experiment—remains 
open.24   
Could it be, then, that both horns of the dilemma offered by EPR must be grasped?  Is 
quantum mechanics both endemically incomplete and dynamically nonlocal?  It is the case that, 
precisely as Pauli indicated in 1933, the one implies the other—something that perhaps should 
have been obvious a very long time ago?  To answer questions like these a systematic study of 
the dynamics of the EPR and other entangled states needs to be carried out, a task that remains to 
be done.  It is notable that entangled (non-additive) Hamiltonians are commonplace in the 
                                                 
22 (Pauli, 1933); quotation from English translation, (Pauli, 1980).   
23 “Einstein has once again expressed himself publicly on quantum mechanics … every time that happens 
it is a catastrophe” (Aczel, 2002, p. 117). 
24 Here in brief are two of the many pieces of evidence for nonlocal dynamics to be considered.  
Theoretical:  although many presentations of “Bohmian mechanics” carefully guard themselves from 
putting it this way, Bohm’s quantum potential, which is implicit in the mathematics of wave mechanics, is 
a manifestly nonlocal contribution to the total energy of multiparticle systems (Bohm, 1952a).  
Observational:  the recent and very important experiment of Lee et al. (2011) prima facie seems to show 
that two physically distant chips of diamond can be put into the same phonon energy state.   
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literature on quantum information; see, e.g., (Dür, Vidal, Linden, & Popescu, 2001).  No one 
seems yet to have studied the structure of the Hamiltonian for the special wave function used by 
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen in 1935, although this would be of great foundational interest.      
I’ll conclude the discussion of the EPR thought experiment by making a brief observation 
that some may find outrageous.  Modern cosmology is built upon the Big Bang model, according 
to which the universe that we observe expanded rapidly (and indeed is still expanding at an 
increasing pace) from a highly compressed state some 14 billion years ago.  (I need not review 
the very strong evidence for this picture here; see (Kirshner, 2002).)  But these are precisely the 
conditions that lead to quantum entanglement:  particles at close quarters interact dynamically 
and remain statistically entailed thereafter even when they separate in space and time.  It would 
seem that the entire universe is, in effect, a vast EPR apparatus.  And if so, what are its 
dynamics?  Is dark energy the entanglement energy of the universe?   
 
5.6 Schrödinger’s ‘Hellish Device’ 
Shortly after the EPR paper appeared, Schrödinger published his famous “cat” paradox which 
was intended to expose the contradictions inherent in quantum mechanics (Schrödinger, 1935a, 
1983).  The key idea of the thought experiment was in part due, again, to Einstein, and was 
hammered out in an extensive correspondence between the two physicists in 1935.  (For detailed 
analysis see Fine, (1986).)  Einstein’s first version of the experiment was entirely at the 
macroscopic level: 
The system is a substance in chemically unstable equilibrium, perhaps a charge of 
gunpowder that … can spontaneously combust, and where the average lifespan of the 
whole setup is a year.  … In the beginning, the ψ-function characterizes a reasonably 
well-defined macroscopic state.  But, according to your equation, after the course of a 
year … the ψ-function then describes a sort of blend of not-yet and of already-exploded 
systems … in reality there is just no intermediary between exploded and non-exploded.  
(Fine, 1986, p. 78) 
Schrödinger soon hit upon the idea of coupling a macroscopic system (an unfortunate cat) to a 
quantum-level system.  A bit of radioactive material has a half-life of an hour; if it decays the 
resulting alpha-particle triggers the release of a deadly poison that instantly kills the cat.  If this 
cruel apparatus is described in the language of quantum mechanics, the wave function for the 
radioactive atoms is entangled with the wave function for the cat, and the cat is presumably in a 
superposition of states, either alive or dead—until we open the box to see what has happened to 
it.  Schrödinger’s version of the experiment is in one respect cleverer than Einstein’s, since it 
shows that macrostates can be infected with quantum uncertainty if they are coupled to 
microstates in just the right way.  Since the idea of the cat being in a superposition of states is 
presumably absurd, and since the dividing line between the quantum and the macroscopic 
(classical) level is arbitrary, the idea of quantum systems being in superpositions must also be 
absurd.  Einstein’s simpler version of the experiment has the conceptual advantage that it 
Happiest Thoughts  Page 23 of 34 
exposes the contradictions that seem to follow from assuming that quantum mechanics (which 
after all is advertised as a universal theory) is applied to ordinary macrosystems.   
A catalogue of responses to the cat paradox is equivalent to a catalogue of proposed 
solutions to the measurement problem, which is to show how it is that measurements on 
superposed quantum systems can apparently produce definite, classical results.  I can’t do justice 
to this literature here and I will only make a few general observations.   
Einstein and Schrödinger’s point can be seen to follow from the EPR sufficient condition 
for reality.  Since presumably opening the box presumably does not disturb the system (here we 
run into a problem similar to Maxwell’s demon), and since we know that when we open the box 
the cat will definitely be in an alive exclusive-or dead state, it must have been in precisely that 
state before the box is opened.  (That is, if we can think of “alive” as a state, then we can think of 
“alive XOR dead” as a state.)  Thus, one way of challenging Schrödinger’s thought experiment is 
to challenge EPR’s reality condition by pointing out that while in quantum mechanics the 
probability may be unity that a system will be found to be in a certain eigenstate when subject to 
a certain measurement procedure, that fact does not entitle us to say that the system was in that 
state before it was measured.   
Another obvious problem with the cat experiment is that a real feline, alive or dead, is a 
complex macrosystem comprised of an enormous number of particles in an incoherent state.  In 
quantum mechanical language it can only be described usefully as a mixture which will behave 
classically (to an extremely good approximation) even if it is coupled to a quantum-coherent 
system.  To this extent the cat was a poor example, even though it drew attention to the problem 
in an almost poignant way.  However, it is now possible to create “Schrödinger cat states”—
macroscopic coherent states (for there is in principle no limit to the size of a quantum coherent 
state) that can be in a superposition (Yam, 2012). 
There are at least two lessons to take from the Einstein-Schrödinger cat.  First, it is still 
not fully understood how quantum processes lead to definite or apparently definite results at the 
macroscale (this is the measurement problem).  Second, the thought experiment emphasizes the 
key fact that the non-classical features of quantum mechanics cannot be safely sequestered to the 
micro-level.  (Here we have another case of an important thought experiment that does not so 
much provide a conclusive argument as it memorably draws attention to a problem.)  As an 
illustration of this point, another important thing that happened in physics in the 1930s was the 
discovery of superfluidity and superconductivity, macro-scale phenomena that are entirely 
manifestations of quantum statistics.  If cost were no barrier, it would be possible to create an 
Olympic swimming pool full of superfluid helium—and recent work in observational cosmology 
shows that the entire universe is a Planckian cavity (Smoot & Davidson, 1993).  If physics is 
quantum all the way down, it is also quantum all the way up.   
 
6. After Einstein 
6.1 Neglected Potential 
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In 1951 the young American physicist David Bohm published an illuminating analysis of the 
EPR thought experiment in his text on quantum theory (1951).  Bohm reformulated EPR’s 
experiment in terms of spin observables.  His version of the experiment had the great virtue that 
it could in principle be performed, opening up the possibility of an experimental test of the 
“quantum DNA” hypothesis.  
Bohm then created a whole new version of (non-relativistic) QM, based on the quantum 
potential, a nonlocal potential field which is a function of the shape of the envelope of the wave 
packet (and thus, in effect, of the phase relationships within the wave function) (Bohm, 1952a, 
1952b; Cushing, 1994).  Bohm’s “interpretation” successfully reproduces the predictions of 
ordinary quantum mechanics and resolves some challenges (regarding scattering) to a similar 
theory that had been proposed by de Broglie in 1927 (see discussion in (Cushing, 1994)).  His 
quantum potential contributes to the energy of a composite quantum system as a whole; in 
general it is distance-independent and it can’t be localized to individual particles.  Most 
physicists were horrified; J. R. Oppenheimer (disgracefully) said, “If we cannot refute Bohm, we 
must choose to ignore him” (Peat, 1997, p. 133).25  All horror aside, Bohm had apparently done 
what John von Neumann had argued could not be done (1955), which was to construct a hidden 
variable theory that apparently could underpin quantum statistics—although in a way that is 
explicitly nonlocal.   
 
6.2 “The Most Profound Discovery of Science” 
John Stewart Bell, who evidently was unworried about whether his career would be irrevocably 
damaged if he were known to have read Bohm’s papers, noted that Bohm had done what von 
Neumann had claimed was impossible—namely, constructed a hidden variable underpinning for 
quantum statistics.  As noted, Bohm’s approach is explicitly nonlocal, and Bell set out to 
determine whether any completion of QM had to be nonlocal.   
Bell used Bohm’s version of the EPR experiment, and considered correlations between 
spin measurements taken on the entangled particles (Bell, 1964).  He took the novel step of 
considering measurements taken in different directions (which allowed comparison between 
different spin components), and he showed that if there were local hidden variables—“quantum 
DNA”—then the correlations must obey certain mathematical inequalities.  Bell then showed 
that according to quantum mechanics, the expectation values for these correlations violates the 
inequalities for a wide range of relative detector angles—they can be more strongly correlated 
(or anti-correlated) than quantum DNA would allow for.  By the 1980s (Aspect, Dalibard, & 
Roger, 1982), experiments showed that Bell's Theorem (the statement that QM violates “local 
realism”) is almost certainly correct, and recent results are closing the last conceivable loopholes 
(Miller, 2016).  There can be no such thing as quantum DNA!  Bell's discovery was called (by H. 
P. Stapp) the “most profound discovery of science” (1975), and well it might be.  It would have 
                                                 
25 Bohm was persona non grata not only because of his unorthodox physics but also due to his refusal to 
testify against his friends who were suspected of left-wing sympathies (Peat, 1997).  I have heard from a 
reliable witness that at Princeton in the 1960s it was a career-ender to mention Bohm’s name.   
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been fitting if Bohm and Bell had shared the Nobel Prize sometime in the 1980s—but the 
academic community did not quite have the courage to make such a radical move. 
The experimental devices that have been used to test Bell’s Theorem are real-world 
versions of the hypothetical EPR apparatus.  Particles are emitted from a source and sent to 
remote locations where they interact with measurement devices such as polarizers or Stern-
Gerlach devices (which detect spin).  A key feature of these modern EPR apparatuses is that they 
employ delayed-choice:  the decision about which parameter of the particles to measure (such as 
spin in various directions) is made (automatically, of course, by a randomizing process) after the 
particles are emitted.  The timing is thus such that it would be impossible for information about 
the detector choice on one side of the apparatus to be transmitted to the detector or particle on the 
other side at any speed less than or equal to the speed of light.  If Einstein’s separation principle 
is correct, then the distant particles should exhibit no stronger correlations than those that could 
be built into them at the source (by the fact, for instance, that their total spins must add up in 
certain definite ways).  But in fact, the Bell-EPR correlations violate the expectations of 
separability.  Does this mean that there really is “spooky action”?  The debate continues.26   
Bell’s Theorem is a special case of a more general result, the Kochen-Specker (KS) 
Theorem (Bub, 1997; Kochen & Specker, 1967; Redhead, 1987):  Quantum statistics cannot in 
general be under-pinned by a Boolean property distribution.  The notion of a Boolean structure 
can be defined precisely in terms of lattice theory (Bub, 1997) but it can be grasped intuitively by 
thinking of every possible measurement on a quantum system as asking the system a question 
(which can always be formulated so as to yield a yes or no answer).  (For instance, “is your spin-
x up?”)  Classical physics presumed that it would always be possible (in principle) to ask such 
questions in a non-invasive way and that the amount of information to be gathered by asking 
more and more questions would monotonically increase.  But for a quantum system, the list of 
possible experimental questions must include questions about non-commuting observables.  The 
Bell-Kochen-Specker results states that if we could answer every possible experimental question 
that could be asked of a quantum system, the set of answers would be logically inconsistent.  
Bell’s Theorem is essentially a special case of the more general Kochen-Specker result, applied 
to a spatially extended system.  As Demopoulos (2004) emphasizes, descriptions of quantum 
systems are incompleteable because the presumption of completeability entails a mathematical 
contradiction.   
This had been anticipated by Schrödinger in 1935: 
… if I wish to ascribe to the model [of a quantum mechanical oscillator] at each moment 
a definite (merely not known exactly to me) state, or (which is the same) to all 
determining parts definite (merely not known exactly to me) numerical values, then there 
is no supposition as to these numerical values to be imagined that would not conflict with 
                                                 
26 Current orthodoxy states that because of Bell’s Theorem, quantum mechanics violates “kinematic” 
locality but not “dynamic” locality; that is, orthodoxy holds that the dynamics of entangled particles is 
still local (additive) despite the endemic violation of Bell’s Inequalities in a wide variety of entangled 
systems.  In my view this position is hopelessly inconsistent, but this question is beyond the scope of the 
present paper.   
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some portion of quantum theoretical assertions ((Schrödinger, 1935a); trans. J. D. 
Trimmer, (1983)). 
Fitting quantum mechanical predictions to a Boolean substrate is like trying to smooth out a 
carpet molded to the surface of a sphere onto a flat floor.  There will be a lump!  We can move it 
around and even hide it under furniture, but we can’t make it go away.  Thus, it is not entirely 
accurate to call “no-go” results such as Bell’s Theorem “no hidden variable” theorems; more 
accurately, they are no Boolean variable theories.  Even more precisely, they are not enough 
Boolean variable theorems, since non-Boolean quantum systems can have Boolean subspaces 
defined by complete sets of commuting observables.   
 Bell’s Theorem is still not well-understood, even in the professional community.  Here is 
Nobel-winner Frank Wilczek on entanglement: 
Measuring the spin of the first qubit tells you about the result you'll get by measuring the 
second bit, even though they might be physically separated by a large distance.  On the 
face of it, this “spooky action at a distance” to use Einstein's phrase, seems capable of 
transmitting information (telling the second spin which way it must point) faster than the 
speed of light.  But that's an illusion, because to get two qubits into a definite [entangled] 
state we had to start with them close together.  Later we can take them far apart, but if the 
qubits can’t travel faster than the speed of light, neither can any message they can carry 
with them (Wilczek, 2008, pp. 117–118). 
Wilczek’s reasoning is unclear, but he seems to suggest that whatever leads to the correlations 
manifested in entangled states must have been built into the particles when they were emitted.  If 
so, the correlations of quantum mechanics would be no more mysterious than the fact that many 
copies of an issue of Physical Review Letters contain the same information because they were all 
printed on one press before they were mailed out to various subscribers.  It is distressing that a 
winner of a Nobel in Physics is seemingly unaware that there is a result called Bell’s Theorem 
whose import is precisely to rule out such “reasonable” explanations.27  The entire point of Bell’s 
Theorem is this:  the assumption that entangled particles are encoded at their source with 
instructions sufficient to satisfy the predictions of quantum mechanics is (in general) 
mathematically inconsistent with the correlations predicted by the theory (and observed in many 
kinds of experiments).  For an elementary but rigorous demonstration of this fact, see (Maudlin, 
2002, Ch. 1).   
 Bell’s momentous result itself is negative:  it rules out a certain class of explanations of 
quantum correlations, but does not by itself say what actually accounts for these correlations 
(beyond the quantum mechanical algorithms with which one calculates them).  The prima facie 
explanation, if there is one, is that there is indeed some sort of spooky action (faster than light 
                                                 
27 J. S. Bell:  “The discomfort that I feel is associated with the fact that the observed perfect quantum 
correlations seem to demand something like the ‘genetic’ hypothesis … For me, it is so reasonable to 
assume that the photons in those experiments carry with them programs, which have been correlated in 
advance, telling them how to behave.  This is so rational that I think that when Einstein saw that, and the 
others refused to see it, he was the rational man. … So for me, it is a pity that Einstein’s idea doesn’t 
work.  The reasonable thing just doesn’t work.”  (In Bernstein, 1991, p. 84.)   
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dynamics) going on, precisely as Einstein had feared.  An enormous amount of intellectual 
energy has been expended trying to find some way of explaining or interpreting quantum 
mechanics so as to avoid this conclusion, which Bell himself and so many others have found so 
distasteful.28  It is this author’s opinion that the dogged efforts to explain away the appearance of 
spooky action have become what Imre Lakatos called a “degenerating research programme” 
(Lakatos, 1976) but it is beyond the scope of this paper to defend this claim.  It is enough here to 
say that Bell’s momentous result remains poorly understood more than fifty years after its 
publication.   
 
6.3 Entangled Paths 
We’ll conclude our (incomplete) list of important thought experiments in modern physics with a 
brief look at interferometry, one of the most powerful tools of modern physics.  The essential 
idea of an interferometer is that particle or light waves are emitted from or collected from a 
common source, directed through different pathways, and brought together and allowed to 
interfere.  The interferometric Michelson-Morley experiment of 1887, no thought experiment, 
showed that it is impossible to detect the motion of the Earth with respect to the hypothetical 
luminiferous ether (Taylor & Wheeler, 1966, pp. 76–78).  Interferometry plays an increasing role 
in modern quantum information theory.  Nielsen and Chuang remark, 
We can now see what an actual quantum computer might look like in the laboratory (if 
only sufficiently good components were available to construct it), and a striking feature is 
that it is constructed nearly completely from optical interferometers (2000, p. 296). 
Given that it is still technically impossible to construct most types of quantum computers that 
have been envisioned, one must say that so far most of the very active field of quantum 
computing is still in the realm of the thought experiment.   
John A. Wheeler, like Mach, was not afraid to think on a cosmological scale.  Imagine a 
quasi-stellar object billions of light years from Earth with a massive galaxy roughly half-way 
between (Wheeler, 1983, pp. 190–195).  The galaxy will act as a gravitational lens (an effect 
predicted by Einstein), and can focus the light from the distant quasar onto detectors in an 
Earthly observatory.  Light emitted from the quasar can take either path on its route to the lab on 
Earth.  Gravitational lensing thus permits interferometry on a cosmological scale.  The light is 
passed through a filter and then through a lens which focusses the light on the input faces of two 
optical fibres.  The experimenters have a choice:  they can either interpose a half-silvered mirror 
at the point at which the two light beams converge, or leave the mirror out.  Omitting technical 
details, the key point is that with the mirror in place the experimenters will see interference 
between the light waves from the quasar, which is only possible if the waves had travelled 
through both paths; whereas with the mirror omitted, the experimenters will detect individual 
photons in one detector or the other and thus be able to tell which path the photons took.  It is 
                                                 
28 In an interview in 1988, Bell stated that according to his theorem, “maybe there must be something 
happening faster than light, although it pains me even to say that much” (Mann & Crease, 1988, p. 90). 
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precisely as if the choice of measurement procedure here on Earth determines (determined?) 
which path the photons took when they were emitted from the quasar billions of years earlier.   
Does this literally mean that the past has an indeterminate ontology? Wheeler himself 
suggests that it does: 
…we are dealing with an elementary act of creation.  It reaches into the present from 
billions of years in the past.  It is wrong to think of that past as “already existing” in all 
detail.  The “past” is theory.  The past has no existence except as it is recorded in the 
present.  By deciding what questions our quantum registering equipment shall put in the 
present we have an undeniable choice in what we have the right to say about the past 
(1983, p. 194).   
As with Bell’s Theorem, one could cautiously interpret Wheeler’s Cosmological Interferometry 
experiment in a purely negative way.  We have to concede that it is contradictory to say that the 
particle had a trajectory before we made our detector choice, but we could refuse to say more.  In 
particular, we might stubbornly refuse to say that our experimental choice here on Earth today 
creates something in the past.  But even if we take this cautiously agnostic stance, we are 
committed to the position that the past is ontologically “gappy.”  On pain of contradiction, there 
are some claims about the past that we just can’t make; Wheeler’s cosmic delayed choice 
experiment thus may well amount to an instance of the Kochen-Specker Theorem.29  Arguably it 
tells against the block universe theory, according to which the universe is a complete four-
dimensional, Riemannian plenum, and it may well provide support for the retrocausal 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, according to which amplitudes from future to past must be 
included in quantum-mechanical calculations (Cramer, 1986).  Like many of the thought 
experiments sketched in this review, there is still much to be learned from Wheeler’s grand 
interferometer.   
 
7 Have Thought Experiments a Future in Physics? 
Einstein himself had a very unusual ability to visualize—or, more accurately, kinaesthetically to 
feel how things work (Einstein, 1945).  An ordinary competent physicist may well believe that it 
is hopeless to attempt to intuitively grasp the workings of nature as fluently as Einstein, any 
more than an ordinary musician can hope to duplicate the cognitive feats of Mozart.  However, 
one can learn from those with extraordinary skills—one can at least try to do what they do.  
Einstein did one thing that can be done by anyone with sufficient intellectual courage:  he 
deliberately sought out the simple, the obvious, the perception that was right under everyone’s 
nose.  One quality that all effective thought experiments have is that the essential insight is both 
simple and obvious—once you see it.  The willingness to seek out the obvious that is not yet 
obvious to most people is as much a matter of temperament as raw cognitive ability, because it 
requires one to be unconventional (as was Einstein)—a risk that sometimes even exceptionally 
intelligent people are not willing to take.     
                                                 
29 This was pointed out to me by Jesse Supina (private communication).   
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 It is reasonable to ask whether there is still a creative role for thought experiments to play 
in physics as it grapples with the ever-increasing abstrusity of quantum gravity, particle physics, 
and string theory.  It could be argued that the frontlines of theoretical physics now operate on a 
level of abstraction that is so far from common experience that the kind of ordinary mechanical 
and spatiotemporal intuitions at which Einstein excelled may no longer have much relevance.  I 
have great faith in the flexibility and adaptability of the human imagination, and I think it is too 
soon to draw such a pessimistic conclusion.  But even if visualization comes to play a decreasing 
role in the physics of the future, it will always be good methodology to seek out the obvious—
and to question the conventional wisdom that too often prevents us from seeing it.   
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